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A Double Hurdle Model of Preferences for a Proposed Capacity 
Reduction Program in the Atlantic Shark Fishery 
 
Introduction and Background 
Overcapacity in the world’s oceans is an issue of increasing concern. Overcapacity occurs when 
fishing effort potential (comprised of the number, size, and efficiency of available vessels and 
crew) is too high relative to the resource base (i.e., the harvest potential exceeds the sustainable 
yield). This can cause the depletion of fish stocks as well as a reduction in the profitability of 
vessels participating in the fishery. Overcapacity has been recognized as a problem by many 
nations; at the 1999 FAO Committee on Fisheries, 120 nations adopted the International Plan of 
Action (IPOA) for the Management of Fishing Capacity with the objective to achieve “an 
efficient, equitable and transparent management of fishing capacity” (FAO 1999). Following the 
subsequent FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, the United States developed a 
National Plan of Action (NPOA) with regards to fishing capacity with the goal to “eliminate or 
substantially reduce overcapacity in 25% of the U. S federally managed fisheries by 2009” 
(NMFS 2004). The NPOA identified several measures to manage overcapacity including 
restricting the number of permits through permit management programs, controlling harvest 
through quota programs, and the purchase and permanent retirement of fishing vessels and/or 
permits with buyback programs. The latter programs, dubbed “buybacks” in this paper, are 
quickly becoming the preferred method of fishing effort reduction, primarily because they can be 
implemented relatively quickly and they target active fishermen and, thus, can more easily gain 
industry support (Larkin et al. 2004).    2
Several previous buyback programs have used a reverse bid process to determine the 
specific owners whose vessels and/or permits would be compensated for permanent removal 
from the fishery (or from all fishing activity) (Kitts, Thunberg, and Robertson 2001). With this 
method fishermen are assumed to estimate the value of their fishing assets (be it the vessel alone, 
vessel with gear, and/or all associated permits) based on the characteristics of those assets, the 
future revenue potential, and their own characteristics and potential employment alternatives 
(Larkin et al. 2004). In most programs, such as the recent Northwest ground fish fishery and 
Alaskan crab fishery buyback programs, owners must also modify their estimated value to 
account for any costs associated with the proposed method to permanently destroy the tangible 
fishing assets (e.g., costs to scrap or net salvage value). The reverse bid process asks owners to 
submit bids (presumably the modified values just described), which are then normalized by a 
measure of historic fishery participation (e.g., average landings during a control period). The 
‘reverse’ refers to the act of sorting the normalized bids in ascending order such that the lowest 
values appear first and represent the least expensive in terms of reducing effort in the fishery on 
a unit landed basis. Fishermen remaining in the industry then agree to pay a tax on future 
landings to fund a loan in the amount of the sum of all accepted bids.  
While buyback programs are generally effective in removing some proportion of capacity 
from the fishery in the short term, program design ultimately determines the effectiveness of 
buyback programs as long-run capacity reduction tools. Understanding how fishermen perceive 
such programs and how they value their fishing rights and assets will allow planners to anticipate 
the potential participation, extent of capacity reduction, and implementation costs that together 
determine the potential effectiveness and feasibility of conducting a buyback program. This 
study sought to determine the level of interest in a voluntary capacity reduction program and to   3
determine what factors affect the level of interest and the estimated value of their fishing rights 
and assets. Such information is the first step in assisting in the design of an effective buy-back 
program that would have the greatest likelihood of being endorsed by the commercial shark 
fishermen in the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic Regions.  
 
The Atlantic Shark Fishery 
The Atlantic shark fishery comprises four species groups; large coastal, small coastal, pelagic 
and deepwater shark (NMFS 2001).With respect to shark in the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic 
region, those fisheries targeting large coastal shark species are of particular concern. Given that 
the large coastal shark stocks in the region are also considered to be overfished, the total 
allowable catch and, subsequently, the expected average catch for any given vessel has been 
increasingly difficult to anticipate. This is due, in part, to the implementation and/or modification 
of a diverse mix of management measures over the last several years including catch quotas, 
allowable gear, and fishing seasons and areas. As a result, the development of efficient 
management schemes to overcome existing overcapacity and overfishing have evaded managers.  
Of particular interest to the vessel owners, however, is the issue of overcapacity, which 
represents a problem that is rooted in their own individual and collective decisions regarding 
capital investment, fishing power, and operational behavior. The commercial shark fishery in the 
Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic is classified as overcapitalized and shark fishermen have recently 
proposed that a buyback program be used to remove excess capacity in this fishery. The federal 
permit database showed that in 2004 a total of 605 shark permits were active (Table 1). These 
permits are classified as either “directed” for those who target and land higher proportions of 
sharks and “incidental” for those that do not target shark but are likely to land a few during each   4
trip. Collectively, these 605 commercial shark permit holders in the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic 
regions held nearly 2,700 other federal fishing permits including 304 swordfish and 302 Atlantic 
tuna permits. This pool of 605 commercial shark permits formed the population from which data 
for this study was collected. 
 
Data and Methods 
Information on the 605 permit owners and vessels (including landings histories from 2001 
through 2003, the most recent complete years of available data) were obtained from various 
NMFS databases. This population was reduced to an effective population of 551 owners in early 
2005 that continued to have a permit and a valid mailing address. A mail survey was sent to all 
551 permit owners regardless of type of shark permit held or whether or not they reported any 
landings from 2001 through 2003. A total of 322 responses were received for an overall response 
rate of 59%. 
The questionnaire contained three sections. The first was designed to elicit information 
on permit holders’ fishing goals and management preferences. The second section collected 
specific information on their fishing operation, including whether they were willing to sell 
(WTS) their fishing enterprise (i.e., shark permit only or all permits and their vessel). It also 
included corresponding willingness to accept (WTA) compensation questions. The contingent 
valuation method (CVM), or WTA-type question, sought to elicit the likelihood that the permit 
owner would be WTA a given bid amount, which was generated for each vessel based on past 
landings using a predicted bid model from the successful bids in a recent buyback program. The 
WTA was elicited by asking respondents to identify how likely they would be on a scale of 0% 
(not at all likely) to 100% (absolutely sure) that they would accept the bid amount offered to   5




This paper investigates the decision-making process of respondents concerning the potential 
participation of commercial shark fisherman in a voluntary capacity reduction program. In this 
study respondents were faced with two decisions, the first being whether or not to participate in 
the program (i.e., sell their shark permit, vessel, and all other permits). For those that were 
willing to sell, the second decision was how likely they would be (on a scale of 0% to 100%) to 
accept the dollar bid amount offered for their assets. An appropriate econometric model to use in 
this case is a version of the double-hurdle regression model.  
The double-hurdle regression model was first developed by Cragg (1971) as an extension 
to the model used by Tobin (1958) to analyze censored data. Tobin’s investigation of durable 
goods purchases relies upon a model where both the decision to purchase and the amount of 
purchase are a function of the same set of explanatory variables, albeit in separate equations. A 
probit model is typically used to estimate the first equation, while a standard regression model is 
generally used to model the second one. In his paper on the subject, Cragg (1971) postulated that 
it was unlikely to be the case that both equations would share the same set of explanatory 
variables; thus, he developed several different model variations and tested them against Tobin’s 
model using data on durable goods purchases. Cragg’s results suggest that his hypothesis was 
correct, stating that Tobin’s model “…seems to fit these data most poorly” (p. 842).   
Subsequently, the double-hurdle regression model has become a general framework 
employed in many different consumer-choice problems; and, because of its structure, it also   6
lends itself well to CVM studies. Recent work by Martinez-Espineira (2004) and Mabiso (2005) 
are such examples whereby the first hurdle determines willingness to pay (i.e., participate), and 
the second hurdle establishes the amount of payment contingent upon clearing the first hurdle. A 
similar format is used in this study, where the first stage of this double-hurdle regression utilizes 
a probit model to estimate owner’s willingness to sell (WTS) their fishing assets. The second 
hurdle differs from other double hurdle models by incorporating an ordered-probit analysis to 
assess, for those willing to sell, how likely are they to accept the dollar bid amount offered in the 
questionnaire. This adaptation follows directly from the format of the survey instrument; instead 
of asking for open-ended willingness to accept values, or even whether respondents would accept 
a randomly-generated bid amount, each permit owner was presented with a bid that was uniquely 
estimated for each vessel. As mentioned earlier, respondents were asked for their likelihood of 
acceptance on a 0% to 100% scale; specifically respondents were asked to identify the likelihood 
that was best reflected by percentages within this range that varied in 25% increments (i.e., it 
was a closed-ended question with five possible mutually-exclusive answers). As such, the 
dependent variable of the second hurdle is categorically ordered as either 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 
or 100%.   
Given this question format, the appropriate general specification for the double-hurdle 
regression model for this study is as follows: 
(1)  i i i X WTS ε β + ′ = . 
Equation (1) is the first hurdle where WTSi represents a binary dependent variable that assumes 
the value of one if the respondent is willing to sell all of their fishing assets (i.e., vessel with all 
permits) or zero otherwise, Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, β is the associated coefficient 
vector estimated by the regression, and εi is the error term. This equation is estimated using the   7
probit technique that employs maximum likelihood calculations to generate the coefficient and 
error vectors.   
The second and subsequent component of this double-hurdle regression is estimated with 
an ordered-probit model: 
(2)  i i i u Z WTA + ′ = γ  
where WTAi is the polychotomous dependent variable ordered as follows: the 0 category 
represents those willing to sell, but have rejected the bid offer; the 1 category includes those 
respondents that are 25% to 50% sure they would accept the bid; and the final 2 category 
contains respondents with either a 75% or 100% likelihood of accepting the given bid. The 
vector of explanatory variables is represented by Zi, γ is a vector of associated coefficients 
estimated by the regression, and ui is the error term. 
The models defined in equations (1) and (2) hypothesize that both the WTS and WTA 
responses are influenced not only by vessel characteristics but also by a combination of 
demographic and socio economic factors.  
 
Empirical Models and Estimation Results 
Probit Model to Estimate WTS 
The vessels owners’ WTS is assumed to be influenced by vessel characteristics, vessels earnings, 
and business aspirations, socioeconomic and demographic factors. The variables included in the 
empirical model are identified in the following equation and defined in Table 2: 
(3) WTS  =  f (EXPAND, EXIT, IMPSHK, BUYALL, PRAWC, LENGTH, VAGE, SOLE, 
VDEBT, AGE, YRSEXP, COMPU, HEALTH, DEGREE, HHINC1, HHINC2, 
FISHINC, NOLAND)   8
The results show that permit owners’ planning to exit the industry, those who support 
buyback programs and household income were the only variables that had a statistically 
significant impact (at the 5% level) on the owners’ willingness to sell their vessel and all permits 
(Table 3). If the owner was planning to exit industry within three years (EXIT) or supported the 
use of buyback programs in general to reduce overcapacity (BUYALL), they were more willing 
to sell their vessel and all associated permits. The level of household income also appeared to 
have an impact on willingness to sell with household income of greater than $100,000 
(HHINC2) having a positive impact on the WTS. Although vessel characteristics are often 
emphasized as the main consideration in the WTS decision, vessel condition variables such as 
vessel age (VAGE), vessel length (LENGTH) and debt on the vessel (VDEBT) were not 
statistically significant. Results of the model suggest that owners take into account their financial 
and economic welfare when considering selling and do not consider their vessels in isolation of 
these socio economic factors. 
  
Ordered Probit Model to Estimate WTA 
An ordered probit model was used to estimate the second part of the decision process faced by 
permit holders. For those who are willing to sell, the research question addressed the factors that 
influenced their willingness to accept the bid amount they were offered. The bid amount that was 
presented to each permit holder was a value for the vessel and all associated permits based on 
their landings from 2001 through 2003. An average of their two highest year’s total revenues was 
first calculated for each vessel. For vessels reporting landings in only one of the three years, the 
value for that single year was assumed to be the average across all years. These values were 
assumed to represent one factor in the determination of the future annual earnings potential for   9
continued commercial fishing. Total revenues were converted to expected bids for surrender of 
their vessel and all permits using a formula based on results of the recent Pacific Northwest 
groundfish buyback program which predicts a declining bid to total landings (as measured in 
dollars) ratio as total landings increases: 
(4)  Bid = 2.935 – 0.0000043 * Landings 
                      (8.84)     (3.23) 
The equation, although simplistic, explained 91% of the variation in the bid amounts. The 
formula produced corresponding bids ranging from just over $15,000 to nearly $456,500 for 
average landed values falling within the range of the data used to estimate the regression. 
Owners of vessels with average annual total revenue below $5,000 (from their best two years in 
all fisheries) were presented with a value of $10,000. Owners of vessels with total average 
annual revenues above the range were presented with values equal to that average (values 
reached nearly $1.6 million).  
The bid value the owner is willing to accept to relinquish the vessel and all permits is 
assumed to reflect the future earning potential of the vessel, which is in turn influenced by the of 
the age and size of the vessel as well as future goals of the fisherman and the availability of 
alternative earning opportunities, which are limited by the level of education of the owner as well 
as his or her age. With these hypotheses, the following model was estimated to explain the 
likelihood (or willingness) to accept the bid amount offered: 
(5) WTA  =  f (BUYALL, AVALUE, SHTAX, LENGTH, VAGE, SOLE, VDEBT, AGE, 
YRSEXP, COMPU, DEGREE, HHINC1, HHINC2, FISHINC, NOLAND, IMR, MU2) 
where WTA is the dependent variable with the three ordered categories of increasing likelihood 
of accepting as described earlier, the new explanatory variables AVALUE and SHTAX equal 1   10
if the permit owner has tried to calculate the value of their fishing assets or are WTP a tax on 
future shark landings to pay for the buyback, respectively, and 0 otherwise. The inverse mills 
ratio (IMR) is also included in the results table.  
The model results showed that six variables were statistically significant at the 5 % level 
(Table 4). Significant variables were willingness to pay tax on shark landings (SHTAX), sole 
proprietorship (SOLE), owner age (AGE), fishing experience (YRSEXP), education level 
(DEGREE), and those without landings (NOLAND).  
Previous U.S. buyback programs have relied on taxing future landings as a means of 
generating the funds to pay for the program. The statistical significance of the SHTAX variable 
indicates that those permit owners who are willing to pay such a tax (SHTAX = 1) are more 
likely to accept the bid offer. This is an interesting result since if they accept the offer, they will 
not be paying the tax since they will no longer be fishing (at least with the same permits and 
gear). This could be a case of strategic response even though the tax question was asked early on 
in the survey and the willingness questions were asked toward the end. 
Model results showed that businesses owned as a sole proprietorship (SOLE = 1) were 
more likely to accept the bid offer, perhaps because they had the authority to make the decision 
for purposes of returning the survey. Older fishermen were more likelihood to accept the bid 
amount presented to them. This would be expected since the earning horizon would be shorter, 
ceteris paribus. Respondents with more commercial fishing experience were less likely to accept 
the bid, which may reflect their intention to continue fishing (i.e., work in the career where they 
have the most experience). It would be interesting to test whether these individuals were also the 
most efficient (e.g., by estimating technical efficiencies). The model also showed that those with 
a college level education were less likely to accept the bid amount offered. This is an interesting   11
result since it is at odds with the conventional wisdom that higher education affords additional 
employment opportunities. Again, estimating technical efficiencies could explain this result. 
The final significant variable indicated that whether the owner had landings influenced 
their WTA the bid. Not having landings (NOLAND = 1) negatively impacted WTA. Those 
owners who had not landed any catch over a period of three years 2001 to 2003 were less likely 
to accept the bid amount offered. This, to some extent, reflects the problem of latent permits (i.e., 
unused fishing capacity) and speculative behavior in the industry whereby vessels with active 
permits (i.e., those who have paid the annual fee) do not fish. If these permits are not captured in 
the buyout process they remain hidden in the industry, but since the permits associated with these 
vessels are current, they can re-enter the fishery anytime thereby eroding the gains from the 
buyout. The observance that shark permit holders without landings of any species across a recent 
three year period are not more willing to sell their vessel with all permits should be qualified by 
the fact that these owners were presented with a threshold bid value of $10,000 since equation 
(4) was not valid for these owners. 
 
Conclusions 
Results of the study suggest that a large proportion of shark permit holders are indeed willing to 
participate in a vessel and permit buy-back program for the proposed bids, but the preferences 
are based on more than the vessel characteristics (e.g., landings). Preferences for the proposed 
buyback program in the Atlantic shark fishery show that industry members consider 
socioeconomic and demographic factors along with vessel characteristics when valuing their 
assets. Thus, if these variables are not taken into consideration during the planning phase of the 
program, the effort removed may not be sufficient to support an effective program.   12
Survey and modeling methods provided a deeper insight into the motivation of vessel 
owners to participate in a vessel and permit buyback program. Having this information prior to 
design and implementation of a buyback program allows more directed planning. Being aware of 
their preferences allows makes it possible it possible to better target those groups that are key to 
an effective program, such as the larger operators who target shark as well as latent permit 
holders who may otherwise not participate. This effort also provides a better understanding of 
the incentives and disincentives to participation, one of which is the funding for such a program. 
Model results imply that the method of funding may be of importance in determining the 
participation in a buyback program for the shark fishery in the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic. This 
is because those left in the industry after the buyout will be faced with the burden of bearing the 
cost of the program and if this compromises the profitability of the business then this may act as 
deterrent from participating in the buyback. 
Data gathered by this type of study can also be extended to approximate the potential 
participation in a buyout in the specific fishery examined as well as approximate a dollar value of 
the costs that can be expected. Having a better idea of market values as perceived by fishermen 
can also help to more accurately estimate the potential capacity reduction associated with a buy-
back program, the financial costs of such a program, and ultimately the economic feasibility of 
its implementation.  
  Lastly, the response rate and success of these preliminary estimations indicate that a 
priori efforts to examine fishermen behavior can help to more efficiently design and effective 
buyback program. The timing of such studies is important since fishery managers do not want to 
find out that their proposed effort reduction plan is off-base after bids have been received, 
especially for stocks that are overfished.   13
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Table 1.  The Total Number of Federal Commercial Fishing Permits Held in Major Fisheries by 
the Type of Commercial Shark Permit Held by the Permit Owner 
Fishery Directed  Incidental  Total 
Shark     249    356    605 
Swordfish    118     186     304 
Atlantic  Tunas    122     179     302 
King  Mackerel  108     136     244 
Spanish  Mackerel    110     133     243 
Reef Fish     81      104      185 
Bluefish        56       94      150 
Other (29 fisheries)    493      925             1418 
   15
Table 2.  Description of Variables in the Probit WTS Equation (1) 
Variable Description 
WTS         =  1 if willing to sell vessel and all permits, 0 not willing to sell 
EXPAND =   1 if owner plans to expand fishing business, 0 otherwise   
EXIT        =   1 if owner plans to exit industry in next 3 years   
IMPSHK  =   Importance of shark to the business: 0=not all important to 4=very important 
BUYALL =   1 if you support buyback for capacity management tool, 0 otherwise   
PRAWC   =   1 if aware of potential for shark buyback, 0 otherwise 
LENGTH =   Vessel length in feet   
VAGE      =   Vessel age in years   
SOLE       =  1 if sole proprietorship,   0 if partnership or cooperation 
VDEBT    =   1 if there is debt on vessel, 0 otherwise 
AGE         =   Owner age in years   
YRSEXP  =   Years experience in commercial fishing   
COMPU   =   1 if use a computer for the fishing business  
HEALTH =   1 if in poor health, 0 otherwise   
DEGREE =   1 if have a college degree, 0 otherwise   
HHINC1  =   2003 household income before taxes: $50,000 to $99,999   
HHINC2  =  2003 household income before taxes: at least $100,000   
FISHINC =   Proportion of household income from fishing  
NOLAND=   1 if no landings for period 2001- 2003, 0 otherwise     16
Table 3.  WTS Model Estimation Results (N = 180) 
Parameter    Coefficient  Standard Error  t-statistic    P-value 
Constant         -0.144        1.184         -0.122   0.903 
EXPAND       0.025         0.345         0.071   0.943 
LEXIT        1.121         0.463         2.424   0.015 
IMPSHK      -0.019        0.125         -0.149   0.882 
BUYALL       1.322         0.295         4.480   0.000 
PRAWC        0.046         0.127         0.360   0.719 
LENGTH      0.00016   0.0098   0.016   0.987 
VAGE         -0.014        0.014         -1.050   0.294 
SOLE         0.074         0.293         0.251   0.802 
VDEBT        0.278         0.331         0.839   0.401 
AGE          -0.0056   0.016         -0.362   0.717 
YRSEXP       -0.0015   0.014         -0.106  0.915 
COMPU        -0.170        0.311         -0.545   0.585 
HEALTH      0.352         0.720         0.488   0.626 
DEGREE       -0.116        0.295         -0.392   0.695 
HHINC1       0.508         0.340         1.495   0.135 
HHINC2       1.102         0.431         2.556   0.011 
FISHINC      0.186         0.471         0.394  0.693 
NOLAND       -0.482        0.421         -1.144  0.253 
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Table 4.  WTA Model Estimation Results (N = 143) 
Variable    Coefficient  Standard Error  t-statistic  P-value 
Constant           -0.370        1.447          -0.255         0.798 
BUYALL       0.651         0.640          1.018         0.309 
AVALUE       -0.370        0.259         -1.433         0.152 
SHTAX        0.837         0.302          2.774          0.006 
LENGTH      0.018         0.010          1.737          0.082 
VAGE         -0.0043    0.012          -0.344         0.731 
SOLE         0.653         0.291          2.248          0.025 
VDEBT        0.109         0.274           0.396          0.692 
AGE          0.041         0.017          2.379          0.017 
YRSEXP       -0.046        0.016         -2.903         0.004 
COMPU        -0.139        0.273          -0.510         0.610 
DEGREE       -0.789        0.262         -3.016         0.003 
HHINC1       0.140         0.303           0.460          0.646 
HHINC2       -0.441        0.368         -1.216         0.224 
FISHINC      -0.170        0.451          -0.372         0.710 
NOLAND       -2.400      0.477         -5.027         0.000 
IMR          0.337         0.831         0.405          0.685 
MU2          1.230         0.192         6.431          0.000 
 